University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

5-22-1958

Towards a Durable Peace - Policy in the Middle East
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Towards a Durable Peace - Policy in the Middle East" (1958). Mike Mansfield
Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 297.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/297

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

FOR RELEASE
THU MAY 2 2 1958 P.
MAlN FlLE coPY

:3peech of Se:::J.ator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
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TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE
III.

An Affirmative Policy in the Middle East

Mr. President:
I take the time of the Senate, today, to consider another aspect
of the problem of building greater stability into the international situation.

This is the third time I have al.l uded to the subject in recent days.
In this series of addresses, I am dealing with some of the major

pressure-points of potential conflict in the world.

I am trying to search

with the Senate, for ideas which may serve to relieve these pressures.

In

short, Mr. President, I am exploring the possibilities of an American initiative for the more durable peace which the world so deeply desires, so deeply
needs.
In my previous statement, I reviewed the realities of the situation
in Europe, as I see them, and suggested measures which may help to break
through the dangerous impasse to peace in that region.

Today, I turn to an-

other area of potential conflict--to the Middle East.
At this moment, Mr. President, the Middle East is not at war and
not at peace.

We may assume, I suppose, if we are given to wishful think-

ing that this situation of neither war nor peace will hold more or less indefinitely.
We cannot rest safely, however, on that assumption.

The most

casual reflection will tell us that it is a highly dangerous assumption
since the underlying tensions of the Middle East remain virtually unchanged.

It seems to me appropriate, therefore, to examine these tensions once again,
to determine what, if

an~~hing,

can be done to abate or control them; to re -

place, with something more durable, what has heretofore been a

pat~ern

of

recurrent ruptures of stability.
At the outset, let me make clear that I do not subscri be to views
which hold either Soviet penetration or Western imperialism or both primarily
responsible for the difficulties in the Micldle East.

If \ve are looking fo r a

target in the propaganda war, then the deviltry of Soviet penetration certatnly
provides one.

If the Russians are looking for the same, then I suppose i"Testern

imperialism is not a difficult mark.

And if Middle Easterners must have a

scapegoat for their troubles, then, they can vent their wrath on Soviet penetration, on Weste rn imperialism, or on both simultaneously.
But if the world wishes in earnest to find a more durable peace,
then we shall have to look deeper, much deeper, into the sources of M1ddle
Eastern tensions.

Certainly, the policies pursued by the Soviet Union, the

Western European nations and the United States at any given time, are relevant
to this matter.

More basic to the problem of peace, however, are the implica-

tions of the vast transition which is taking place within the Middle East.
This transition and the tensions it brings have a vitality independent of the
policies of nations outside the region.

Mr. President, a fundamental change involving the lives of tens of
millions of people is never made with ease.
exception.

Change in the Middle East is no

Change in the Middle East is exceptional only in its massiveness.

What this change involves is an enormous effort by millions to leap over forgotten generations of political obscurity into the mainstream of international
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life.

It involves a desperate struggle to push aside the accumulated sands

of social inertia and to emerge several hundred years later into the 20th
Century.

It involves an endeavor to rid the earth of one of its heaviest

concentrations of stagnating poverty, superstition, fear and disease, of
the ugliest forms of human subjugation--and to do it virtually overnight.
The basic pressure for this desirable, this constructive change
is produced by nationalism.

Whatever difficulties nationalism may bring,

let there be no mistake, Mr. President, about its necessity.

Nationalism

is essential in the Middle East to produce the change essential for durable
peace.

To deny its validity is to deny our own history.
The difficulty in the Middle East arises not from nationalism as

such.

The difficulty arises from the unpredictable course which Middle

Eastern nationalism may take at a highly critical moment of history, at a
moment when the peace of the world balances on a razor's edge.
nature, this force is not easily channeled.

By its very

When a whole people break out

of an existing pattern of life into something new, it is not easy to calculate
or control the direction of the great human surge which is released by the
fission.
There was a time, perhaps, when mankind could sustain the excesses,
the errors, the random scattering of the power of an explosive nationalism.
That is no longer the case.

In the present state of international affairs,

nationalism on a rampage endangers not only those who release it; it endangers peace and, hence, the peoples of the entire world.
The needs of mankind require that nationalist leaders, today, not
only lead national awakenings but that they lead them soberly and responsibly.

- 4The needs of mankind reQuire that these leaders lead with due regard for the
dangerous complexities of current international life.
In the Middle East, the world skirts the edge of disaster, not because of nationalism, but because nationalism has not fully established a
~ew

pattern of constructive and peaceful progress to replace the older and

no longer acceptable pattern which it has destroyed.

The force of nationalism,

at present, plunges headlong into western interests established many decades
ago--special interesto, perhaps--but interests, never+,heles:;, which cannot be
liQuidated overnight if they are to be liQuidated in peace.

Further, this

force divides into shifting political and regional alignments, which clash
one with another and, in so doing, threaten tne stability of the region.

It

collides with or scoops into its fury ancient focals of power which have a
vested interest in the preservation of the accumulated social rot of centuries.

It recharges tribal feuds that go back to biblical times.

It plays

with the dangerous fire of great-power balance in the naive belief that it
is too clever to get burned.

Too often, it pushes precious human energies

into the wasting-pit of militarisn, terrorism and mobism.

Too often, Mr.

President, it sidesteps the one path which will lead, more QUickly than any
other, to full national and human eQuality--the pa th of unremitting effort
to establish orderly, progressive societies with responsible governments.
These, Mr. President, are some of the less desirable spawns of
nationalism in the Middle East.

They are products of the nationalist fis-

sion in that area, its destructive products, and they are, in my opinion,
the principal source of the region's instability.

We overlook this source

when we see the problems of peace in the Middle East as arising solely from
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Soviet machinations, as the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 did and still does,
despite clarification and modification by the Senate.

The Russians overlook

it, if, in fact, they see these problems as arising primarily from Western
imperialism.

If we continue to overlook it, we shall have policies which

deal primarily with shadow rather than substance--costly policies and in the
end, probably futile policies.
An affirmative policy for peace, sooner or later, must look squarely

at the inner difficulties of the Middle East.

Before this nation can have

that kind of policy, however, we must have a better understanding of American
interests in the region.
It is not difficult, Mr. President, to catalogue the most significant of these interests.
or obscure them.

They are legitimate interests and we need not hide

Certainly, we need not apologize for them.

United States companies have heavy investments in Middle Eastern
petroleum development; that is an American interest.

We have bases or other

defense arrangements against aggression in the Middle East, that, too, is an
American interest.

We have trade, cultural, educational and other ties with

the Arab States and Israel; these are American interests.

We have a commerce

through the air and sea lanes and the petroleum pipelines of the region; these,
too, are American interests.

We have a stake in a stable Western Europe which,

in turn, is now heavily dependent for economic stability on Middle Eastern
petroleum, trade and trade routes; that is a highly important, if indirect,
American interest.
Beyond all these specific concerns, however, we have one national
interest that is overriain&.·

That is an interest in the peace of the entire
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Middle East.

I speak, now, not of a peace at any price, of a peace of in-

ertia, appeasement or repression.

I speak of a durable and vital peace

which will provide an opportunity for essential change to take place in
the Middle East, the change which will enable the peoples of that region,
if they have the will, to live in a satisfying national independencP. in the
20th Century.
On that kind of peace depends the long-run survival of all the
part:i.cular interests of Americans.

On that kind of peace in the Middle

East may well de:9end the pee.(!e of all Americans and -c.he world.
I do not know, Mr. President, whether any policies pursued by this
nation will be able to assist in producing such a
It seems to me l:_it;hly

-,mlii.:.·~ly

cies are made subserv:.eat

i~.1

pe£".~e

i:1

~;;v=

Middle Ea:3t.

that they will do so, however, if these poli-

concept or in ad.'llinistrati on

':CJ

any S-;;Jecial

American interest, whet!ler it be pe troleum concessions, defense ar:: e.ngements,
ties with the Arab States or Israel, or any other.
Certainly, it is deisrable, Mr. President, for Ame:;.·icans to JIG'. r ticipate in the development of Middle Eastern

pe~roleum,

profits them and serves the people· of that region.

if this development

It is not desirable, hovr-

ever, for all Americans to go hat and pail in hand to any country to beg for
oil.

That, in effect, is what we may be doing if American policies are made

subordinate to this particular American interest.
Certainly it is desirable to have bases and other defense arrangements in the Middle East if they grow out of a common concern with security
against aggression.

It is not desirable to have these arrangements, however,

if we must grovel before any nation in order to obtain or to keep them.

That,
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in effect, is what we may be doing if these defense arrangements are elevated
into the principal objective of policy.
Certainly, it is desirable for Americans to have cultural, trade,
educational or other friendly ties with the Arab States and Israel.

It is

not desirable, however, if these attachments mean that all Americans must
acquiesce in an aggressive hatred of Arab toward Israeli or Israeli toward
Arab or Arab toward Arab.

That, in effect, is what we may be asked to do if

our national policy is subordinated to these specific attachements.
Finally, may I say, Mr. President, that it is certainly desirable
for us to recognize the neec of Western European allies and other friendly
nations for access to the peotroleum, the trade and trade routes of the
Middle East.

It is not desirable, however, to recognize this need without

also recognizing that the unequal privileges of yesterday's colonialism must
yield to the requirements of a constructive nationalism today.

Mr. President, that is the first step in an affirmative policy for
the Middle East:

to get clearly in our own minds that the national interest

in a vital peace in the Middle East takes precedence over any particular
American interest.

Those who conceive and administer United States policy

must understand that.

Other nations must understand it .

It is particularly

important that those who play dangerously with a destructive nationalism and
those who seek to repress a constructive nationalism know it.
I am afraid, however, that we shall not impress anyone by words,
whether they be the soft generalities on peace or the violent terms of the
propaganda war.

What cannot be done by words, perhaps, can be done by acts,

acts which make clear that the primary American interest in the Middle East
is an interest in a vital peace and that we are determined to pursue it.
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No single act in this connection is more important than to develop
alternatives to Middle Eastern petroleum and to the pipe-lines and waterways
through which it now moves.

In 1956, Mr. President, a year befo1·e the Suez

crisis, I urged in a speech in the Senate (April 18, 1956) that this country
begin to plan in concert with oil-consuming countries against the possibility
of a temporary cut-off in the flow of Middle Eastern oil.

What was needed

then, was an immediate increase in the supply of sea-going tankers of large
tonnagej preparations which would have permitted a prompt expansion infue
petroleum output of t'l:>.e Western Hemispherej and a speed-up in the development
of nuclear energy for :power.

So far as I know, however, nothing was done

along these line 3 until the following yea-;: when the

S \~1'-! z

e:r: . . ~ s vJas already

U}K··n US.

I do --:ot srq.) Mr . ?:cesid.<:-nt, that the immediate

a-r-~i l.c>.bj ' .j_ ty

alternatives to Middle Eastern oii vTOuld have prevented the S:.:.ez

o:!:'

~:: ·iGis.

It seems to me very possible, ho..-ever, that it might have mitigated it.
And it seems to me very poss:!_ble now that the availability of alte::nativ8s
to petroleum from that source may discourage similar crises.

Cert~inly,

it

will help to meet such crises if they should come.
What is true if alternatives to petroleum is also true of alternatives to defense arrangements in the Middle East.

I assume that any arrange-

ments we now have serve the mutual benefit of ourselves and the Middle Eastern
countries which participate in them.
common interest.

I hope that they will go on serving a

By the same token, however, I hope that the Defense Depart-

ment will begin now to plan to safeguard this country without these arrangements, if the price of retaining them is a servile submission to one-sided
terms, to conditions vThich degrade this nation .
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Finally, it ought to be made clear, if it is not already clear,
that this country has a deep interest in the survival and progress of
Israel.

This country's policies should unashamedly sustain that interest

so long as the Israelis pursue their progress in peace.

We can and must

be prepared to override the particular interest, however, in the greater
national interest, if Israel abandons the ways of peace.
What applies to Israel applies equally to the Arab States.
should say that the Administration has

alrea~y

I

gone out of its way to make

clear that this country has a deep interest in the suxvival and progress
or these states, but, if by some chance, further assurances are necessary
then they should be given.

This country's policies should sustain the in-

terest so long as the Arabs pursue their progress in peace.

We can and we

must be prepared to override the particular interest, however, in the greater
national interest, if the Arab States, singly or collectively abandon the
ways of peace.
Whether we demonstrate our concern in the peaceful progress of
the Arab States and Israel by public statements, by the channels of diplomacy
or by some other way, is a secondary question.

The important point is that

the interest be made clear to both sides and that the word,

~eaceful,

be

underlined for both sides.
What I have been trying to suggest, Mr. President, is that we need
to inject into national policies in the Middle East, a clarity of purpose,

of primary national purpose, which they do not now have.

I am also suggest-

ing that we develop alternatives to present particular American interests
which will permit sufficient flexibility in the pursuit of this purpose.
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I believe, Mr. President, that since World War II, we have been
groping towards an affirmative policy of this kind, under both a Democratic
and a Republican administration.

There has been an obvious official apprecia-

tion of the importance of a durable peace in that area.

There has been an

appreciation of the importance of nationalism in achieving that peace.

There

has been a desire to support its stirrings, modified by the fear of alienating the nations of Western Europe, which formerly held most of the area as
colonies, protectorates and mandates.

It has been modified, too, by the

fear of jeopardizing the particular interests of Americans in that region.
Despite good intentions, policy in the Middle East is now encased
in a gigantic, expensive holding action.

It is not directed primarily to-

wards building a vital durable peace in that region.

It is directed primarily

towards preventing the inner tensions of that region from snapping.
The result has been a broadside effort to please all which obviously
pleases none.
country.

The result has been a vast decline in the prestige of this

The result has been a growing contempt and antagonism towards Ameri-

cans, despite hundreds of millions of dollars expended in various kinds of
aid.

The result, Mr. President, was a conduct of foreign policy bordering

closely on appeasement of arrogance and submission to blackmail, until the
Secretary of State put a stop to this nonsense by withdrawing the Aswan Dam
proposal.

Putting aside the question of the manner in which this vms done,

I can only endorse what was apparently his determination not to permit this
country to be made a pawn in someone's balancing game.
Mr. President, I am afraid, that if we go on as we have, we shall
not, in the end, prevent the tensions from giving way in the Middle East.
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In the end, we shall not prevent communism or some other form of totalitarianism from sweeping through the region.

In the end, the particular interests of

Americans may well be lost along with the general interest of all Americans in
a durable peace.
Good intentions, as I have said, have not been lacking in Middle
Eastern policies during the past decade.

What we have lacked, is a full

appreciation of the priority of the interest of the whole nation in that
kind of peace.

What we have lacked, I believe, is an acute sense of dis-

crimination as between constructive and destructive nationalism as the
primary instrument for producing that kind of peace.
If there has been one great error of policy in the past decade,
it has been this failure to draw a line of distinction between thse two
expressions of nationalism.

There have been those who have advocated in-

discriminate support of Arab nationalism in the Middle East.

There have

been some who have advocated indiscriminate support of Israeli nationalism
in the Middle East.

There have not been, or at least we have not heard, the

voices of those who distinguish between constructive and destructive nationalism, regardless of whether it is Arab or Israeli.
That error must be rectified if we are to move towards an affirmative policy in the Middle East.

There is little value in going back into

the history of the past decade in a search for scapegoats for failure in the
Middle East.

What is vitally important to the American people is not what

was done or not done in the past.
from now on.

What is vitally important is what is done
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It seems to me, Mr. President, that what we require first is a new
concept of policy, a concept which puts first things first, a concept whi ch
recognizes that the interest of all the people of the United States in a vital
and durable peace in the Middle East takes precedence over any particular
American interest.

We require, too, officials to administer this policy who

are able to put aside personal interests, predilections and bias in their
pursuit of that interest.

We require, further, officials who are able to

draw a distinction between constructive and destructive expressions of nationalism and to appreciate the relevance of this distinction in building a vital
and durable peace in the Middle East.
I know that the distinction is a subtle one in a region as complex
as the Middle East.
be drawn.

Nevertheless, I believe it can be drawn; indeed, it must

Unless it is drawn, we will find ourselves applying such influence

and resources as we have in that region impartially as between those who would
destroy and those who would construct, and the one effort will cancel out the
other, as, in fact, has been happening.
Such influence and resources as we can apply--if we are to apply
any at all--must be channeled largely in line with those who
build stability and responsibility in the Middle East.

ar~

working to

If we are not to waste

our strength in well-meaning but futile gestures, this nation must stand, not
indiscriminately with Middle Eastern nationalism; rather, we must stand with
its constructive expression, whether it emanates from Israel, particular Arab
States or all the Arab States.
We may well ask ourselves, is it really so difficult to de t ermine
what is constructive or destructive in the na tionalism of the Middle East?
It seems to me that there are simple guidelines which may be applied if we
wish to use them.
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Certainly, a constructive nationalism will insist that the unequal
privileges of a past colonialism go.

It 'rill exercise, hovrever, in the larger

interests of mankind, the patience and restraint which will permit these privileges to be liquidated in an orderly manner.

When nationalism exercises

that kind of patience and restraint it deserves the support of this nation
and the world.

Similarly, when Western nations manifest a willingness to

liquidate their special privileges in an orderly fashion they deserve our
support against the buffetings and blows of a nationalism on a rampage.
A constructive nationalism will seek to encourage a peaceful commerce with the rest of the world on a mutually beneficial basis.

It will

not seek to parlay an accident of geography, whether it be petroleum beneath
the ground or the sea. lane-s, airlanes or pipelines through e.nd over its territories into an economic stranglehold on the peoples of the •rorld, it vTill not
use a natural blessing of this kind as a lever to upset the peace of the world.
A constructive nationalism will apply the resources and the energies
of its people primarily to the enormous tasks of stamping out hunger, ignorance, disease and injustice \·Ti thin its borders.

It \rill not command these

resources and energies for the personal pleasures of a ruler; it will not
direct them into militarism, terrorism, conspiracy, mobism and subversion.
It will not divert these energies into an unremitting campaign of all-consuming
hatred--whatever its real or imagined grievances--against other peoples in the
region and outside the region.
A constructive nationalism, in short, will 1vork for the orderly
progress of its own people.
peace in the world.

It will work for peace in the region and for

- 14I know, Mr. President, there are few black and white results if these
tests are applied to the course of nationalism in the Middle East during the
past decade.

All of the countries involved, in one degree or another, have

manifested destructive and constructive tendencies.

They shall undboutedly con-

tinue to do so in the future, in one degree or another.

For the foreign policy

of the United States, however, the critical questions are, how destructive?
How constructive?

The questions are questions of degree and the answers can

only rest on the judgment of the Administration which is charged with responsibility for carrying out foreign policy.
I would be less than frank if I did not express my view that this
judgment has been faulty in the past.

For too long, this Administration has

shown a lack of discrimination as regards nationalism in the Middle East.
too long, it has tended to coddle its destructive expression.

For

For too long, it

has treated with something approaching reluctance, if not disdain, the constructive manifestations of this force in Lebanon and Israel.

We have reaped con-

sequences of this faulty judgment in the past, in the Suez seizure, in the
spread of conspiracy, subversion and terrorism throughout the region.

vie are

reaping others now in the ordeal in Lebanon, one of the most progressive and
peaceful of the Middle Eastern States.

We may reap them elsewhare unless this

servile tendency to flirt with a rampant nationalism is finally curbed.
I know, Mr. President, that the question of distinguishing between
constructive and destructive nationalism is complicated b,y the persistence
of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Perhaps the time has come to make clear, how-

ever, that as far as United States policy is concerned, we shall no longer
permit ourselves to be stopped, by fear of a breakdown in this situation,
from pursuing a constructive course in the Middle East.

Perhaps the time

bas come to make clear that as far as the United States is concerned there

- 15 is going to be no going back in this situation.

Those leaders in the region

who look to an eventual solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute by force, with
American acquiescence, do a disservice to their own people and to all the
peoples of the world.

They permit a disgraceful hatred to gnaw at their

vitals and, in the end, they will not solve the problem.

On the contrary,

unless they come to grips with it soon, not only will they destroy the promise
of a constructive nationalism for their own peoples, they will destroy it for
~11

the peoples of the Middle East .
It is time to make clear once and for all that United States policy

cannot and will not support the fantasy of some Arab leaders of eventually
pushing Israel into the sea.

Equally the policy of this nation cannot and

will not support a fantasy of Israeli expansion at the
States.

of the Arab

eh~ense

To permit the illusion to remain any longer that we may be drawn in

time into the web of the one dream or the other serves no useful purpose.
Perhaps it may put off the reckoning from today until tomorrow.

In so doing,

it may even help to create an illusion of peace, but it will not contribute
to a durable vital peace in the Middle East.
What the United States can support, indeed, what we must support
are international efforts to put at rest any genuine fears of aggression,
Arab of Israeli or Israeli of Arab or, indeed, Arab of Arab.

To that end,

Mr. President, it seems to me high time for this country to take an initiative for peace.

It seems to me high time to propose in the United Nations

the extension of the United Nations Emergency Force to the borders of any
country in the Middle East which is concerned with aggression from a neighbor
and which asks for that safeguard.

It is time, in short, to determine who is

really afraid of war and who is really afraid of peace in the Middle East.
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It is time, too, Mr. President, for this country to take the initiative in the United Nations and to call again upon Israel and the Arab Sta t es
to end their state of belligerency.

It is time to call upon them to meet face

to face, to meet as honest men, as decent human beings and try to make at least
the beginnings of a beginning on reducing the deep-seated bitterness between
themselves, in their interest and in the interest of the world.

If they do so

meet, if they do make a beginning, then, whatever we or any other nation can
reasonably do to bring stability between them should be done.

It is time, in

short, to see who seeks peace and who is afraid of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. President, in making these suggestions, I do not prejudge any
nation, any leader, any position in the Middle East.

I suggest only that,

regardless of what has happened in the past, it is time for Middle Eastern
nationalism to come of age, to recognize its responsibilities not only to
itself but to all mankind.
By the same token, it is time for the policies of this country to
come of age.

It is time for these policies to cease playing the role of in-

dulgent father to errant son.

It is time to direct these policies strictly

in support of those nations which work sincerely for peace, which make an
unremitting effort to put the energies of nationalism into the building of
peaceful, progressive and responsible States.
When these policies are so directed perhaps then, and only then,
shall we be in a position to come to grips with Soviet penetration, as it
may exacer bate the danger to peace in the Middle East.

Perhaps then, we

shall cease to waste hundreds of millions of dollars belonging to all Americans in seeking to safeguard the interes t s of particular Americans, in s eeking to catch up with and to extirpate the elusive spector of communism as it
flits from country to country, from the Maghreb to the Hindu Kush.
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For} then, Mr. President, we shall be prepared to confront Soviet
words of peace with acts of peace.

We shall be prepared, as we ought to be

prepared, to offer in the United Nations a proposal to establish an enforcable
international control over the arms traffic in the Middle East.
And we shall be prepared to join with any nation with a stake in
peace to assist the constructive forces of nationalism in the Middle East
dealing with the ancient tyranny of starvation, disease, ignorance, and in-

humanity.

The world shall be able to see, then, and, only then, Mr. President,

who talks peace and who means peace.

